Intelligent Being

《华尔街日报》今天改版了，将有更多政治和社会新闻，多了一个页社论和评论版。在美国新闻界树立为杰出新闻标志的头版专栏A-hed从此消失，丰碑成了墓碑。刚上任11个月的新执行主编Marcus Brauchli今天被披露即将下课。变化太快。这后面的故事大概都能猜到几分。

新老板默多克决定按照自己的意图塑造新的《华尔街日报》，动作之快，反映了这个报纸不再被内部记者出身的人管理的事实。默多克希望该报从编辑和广告销售角度更多地接近《纽约时报》，更广泛的内容，当然相应的是更广泛的广告客户基础。在报业受到互联网狂风暴雨般打击的时候，不知道这招棋是否正确。显然，默多克相信《日报》的传统读者，那些富有、政治保守的读者依然忠实该报（我不怀疑），同时可以吸引新的读者和相应的广告收入。另一方面，这种新闻版面的变化可能稀释该报的品牌力量。

众所皆知，该报最合默多克胃口的根本不是新闻版面，而是评论版，美国保守主义的舆论大本营。新版即出，默多克的作为作者的名字就出现在该版上Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance，他大声呼吁强化英美合作，打造大西洋联盟的新局面。这个标题和前两天英国首相在该报的评论文章标题的动名词是一样的: Englarging。可以说这两个标题完全一样: Anglosphere=the Atlantic Alliance。

默多克作为拿美国护照、剑桥受教育的澳大利亚人，以上呼吁于他最合适不过。环球还是盎格鲁人的胜利。谁能否定，默多克个人的成就不是自由和民主以及法治的在盎格鲁世界成就的集中表现。

《华尔街日报》可能将增添越来越明显的党性特色，默多克将把这份报纸变成一份英伦式的报纸。美国新闻界讲究平衡和客观，但也承认现实上不能实现。与其便扭地藏着蹑着，不如立场鲜明。

很多人把西方媒体和民众的支持藏独和歪曲事实归因为中共政府公关的失败。Zwoof作了一番令人信服的功课：我们看到其实是一场宣传战争。中共提供的西藏信息固然不可信（全信），西方媒体援引的消息和他们的集体意识同样不足信，这不是什么公关较量，而是意识形态的宣传战。

西藏流亡政府和西方媒体这次主要借用自由亚洲电台(Radio Free Asia)的嘴来说话，Zwoof发现这个电台不仅是美国国会资助的private media（private!?），而且背后的金主是美国新保守主义的大本营Project for a New American Century，其核心成员包括数位伊拉克战争的设计师。

虽然James Miles明确在CNN对其采访中表示他目睹的是一个民族对另外一个民族有预谋有组织的暴力迫害：What I saw was calculated targeted violence against an ethnic group, or I should say two ethnic groups, primarily ethnic Han Chinese living in Lhasa, but also members of the Muslim Hui minority in Lhasa. And the Huis in Lhasa control much of the meat industry in the city. Those two groups were singled out by ethnic Tibetans. They marked those businesses that they knew to be Tibetan owned with white traditional scarves. Those businesses were left intact.

但他的证词完全不合CNN & BBC的胃口和需要。

Zwoof借美国左派知识分子、语言学家和政论家 Noam Chomski 的话来阐释上述西方主流媒体作为无意识的宣传机器（vs党的宣传机器）的集体意识根源。

The beauty of the democratic systems of thought control, as contrasted with their clumsy totalitarian counterparts, is that they operate by subtly establishing on a voluntary basis-aided by the force of nationalism and media control by substantial interests- presuppositions that set the limits of debate, rather than by imposing beliefs with a bludgeon. Then let the debate rage; the more lively and vigorous it is, the better the propaganda system is served, since the presuppositions (U.S. benevolence, lack of rational imperial goals, defensive posture, etc.) are more firmly established. Those who do not accept the fundamental principles of state propaganda are simply excluded from the debate (or if noticed, dismissed as “emotional,” “irresponsible,” etc.).

抵制的声音不绝于耳。最令我震惊的是，周六收到高中语文老师的短信，（应该是转发的），檄文般地呼吁全体炎黄子孙和各民族人民抵制法国品牌和美国品牌。信息里面充满义和团的喝喝声。之所以说是品牌而不是货是因为，家乐福也好，麦当劳也罢，他们当中有很多中国的利益：员工，供应链等等。民族主义的火和圆明园的火如今对着烧。

与此同时，各种民主主义理论和解读以及阴谋理论都在争取大家的耳朵。名博冉云飞援引大量西方明哲嘲笑国民的爱国热情，呼吁不要被政府利用。一些记者名笔呼吁理智表达爱国和民族主义情绪；官方则谨慎地试图控制这熊熊烈火。我看每个阵营都有合理的因素。无论你听谁的声音，你不免莫棱两可，矛盾重重。这也是开放三十年我们的心理，在暧昧的年代。

一方面，深受西方自由民主思想（甚至普世价值）影响人指责西方媒体和示威大众脑残，其实与我党的愚民教育同出一辙，殊途同归，对奥运不要同情；但他们听到CNN种族主义者对自己这个群体的辱骂时，我不知道他们是否依然气定神闲。不知道既受党的气又受西方媒体气的王力雄们是否依然心平气和，立场分明。

另一方面，到处燃烧的对法国人和美国人怒火的民众以及互联网上的语言暴徒所使用的语言和行为让我们看到原来义和团精神如此具有遗传性。自由派批评者说，看，这就是仇恨教育的结果，喝狼奶长大的一代人，愚昧。与此同时，巴黎和伦敦的示威难道不是另一个文明的人的愚昧，和教会一样，民主自由价值观也能洗人的脑。CNN和BBC体现的难道不是火烧圆明园那些基督教白人的遗传？愤怒的美国人难道不是动辄就宣布永远不买Made In China?谁能裁判哪种愚昧/民族主义更加合法和优越？

爱因斯坦在1934年欧洲反犹浪潮逐渐进入高潮时，多次就犹太复国主义和犹太民族问题发表演讲。他呼吁，在巴勒斯坦重新建立犹太国家是保证全世界散居的犹太人不再受到迫害和歧视的唯一办法，因为一个民族需要一个团结统一的实体来保护自己。以色列现任总理Olmet针对国内外犹太人对以色列的批评时说：只有犹太人的以色列才能根本上保护犹太人。

爱因斯坦不仅看透了宇宙，他还看透了历史。

对此，那些最近在巴黎，伦敦，洛杉矶，旧金山和渥太华游行的华人恐怕对此不冉云飞等人更有切肤体会。

我相信今天开放的中国是全球化的受益者和贡献者。我是全球化的支持者。我不会去抵制任何法国和美国品牌。不过对于藏独暴动者，对于理查基尔，对于巴黎和伦敦呼吁抵制奥运和中国的人，对于CNN的主持人和记者，我要说的是：Fuck You All.

白人小心，黄祸又来了。

不管是要求抵制奥运的西方人还是要求抵制法国品牌的中国人都吃了媒体的毒药，不管哪种媒体。民主也是盲目的。媒体没有客观。结果经常是，大众要么什么都信，要么什么都不信。不过，这就是真实的世界。人的智力有限，于是有了神（和穿Gucci的达赖喇嘛）。

上上期的《纽约客》（迟到了两周，正常）在一篇关于美国报业危机的文章中提到了美国媒体的精英化和草根化的知识界论战。一方是上世纪最伟大的记者和时评家Walter Lippmann，一方是John Dewey。我不知道后者是谁。

我把该文对Lippmann 80多年前有关民主和媒体的理论摘到这，试图对上述观点做一个注解：

Journalism works well, Lippmann wrote, when “it can report the score of a game or a transatlantic flight, or the death of a monarch.” But where the situation is more complicated, “as for example, in the matter of the success of a policy, or the social conditions among a foreign people—that is to say, where the real answer is neither yes or no, but subtle, and a matter of balanced evidence,” journalism “causes no end of derangement, misunderstanding, and even misrepresentation.”

Lippmann likened the average American—or “outsider,” as he tellingly named him—to a “deaf spectator in the back row” at a sporting event: “He does not know what is happening, why it is happening, what ought to happen,” and “he lives in a world which he cannot see, does not understand and is unable to direct.” In a description that may strike a familiar chord with anyone who watches cable news or listens to talk radio today, Lippmann assumed a public that “is slow to be aroused and quickly diverted . . . and is interested only when events have been melodramatized as a conflict.” A committed élitist, Lippmann did not see why anyone should find these conclusions shocking. Average citizens are hardly expected to master particle physics or post-structuralism. Why should we expect them to understand the politics of Congress, much less that of the Middle East?

Lippmann’s preferred solution was, in essence, to junk democracy entirely. He justified this by arguing that the results were what mattered. Even “if there were a prospect” that people could become sufficiently well-informed to govern themselves wisely, he wrote, “it is extremely doubtful whether many of us would wish to be bothered.” In his first attempt to consider the issue, in “Liberty and the News” (1920), Lippmann suggested addressing the problem by raising the status of journalism to that of more respected professions. Two years later, in “Public Opinion,” he concluded that journalism could never solve the problem merely by “acting upon everybody for thirty minutes in twenty-four hours.” Instead, in one of the oddest formulations of his long career, Lippmann proposed the creation of “intelligence bureaus,” which would be given access to all the information they needed to judge the government’s actions without concerning themselves much with democratic preferences or public debate. Just what, if any, role the public would play in this process Lippmann never explained.

John Dewey termed “Public Opinion” “perhaps the most effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever penned,” and he spent much of the next five years countering it. The result, published in 1927, was an extremely tendentious, dense, yet important book, titled “The Public and Its Problems.” Dewey did not dispute Lippmann’s contention regarding journalism’s flaws or the public’s vulnerability to manipulation. But Dewey thought that Lippmann’s cure was worse than the disease. While Lippmann viewed public opinion as little more than the sum of the views of each individual, much like a poll, Dewey saw it more like a focus group. The foundation of democracy to Dewey was less information than conversation. Members of a democratic society needed to cultivate what the journalism scholar James W. Carey, in describing the debate, called “certain vital habits” of democracy—the ability to discuss, deliberate on, and debate various perspectives in a manner that would move it toward consensus.

Dewey also criticized Lippmann’s trust in knowledge-based élites. “A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge,” he argued. “The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied.”

Lippmann and Dewey devoted much of the rest of their lives to addressing the problems they had diagnosed, Lippmann as the archetypal insider pundit and Dewey as the prophet of democratic education. To the degree that posterity can be said to have declared a winner in this argument, the future turned out much closer to Lippmann’s ideal. Dewey’s confidence in democracy rested in significant measure on his “faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished.” But nothing in his voluminous writings gives the impression that he believed these conditions—which he defined expansively to include democratic schools, factories, voluntary associations, and, particularly, newspapers—were ever met in his lifetime. 

一位前同事加拿大人饭局上曾经跟我说到：在我有生之年将目睹美国的衰和中国的崛起。我对此记忆深刻。这个话题其实已经在媒体，学界和民间传开。各种理论都有。《纽约客》最新一期的书评就是针对几本论述美国霸权遭遇挑战的新书进行了综合评论。前面就说过，最近西方媒体对待奥运火炬和西藏问题的激烈反应多少体现了他们的一种对假象的强大中国的焦虑和担心。

其中就有Bill Emmott的新书Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade。果然如期出版了。去年5月在北京见到Bill，他说会在今年4月出版。我问他是否考虑出中文版，因为这毕竟是关于中国的。也许是他对检查制度的过分怀疑，对此他似乎有所保留。无论如何，我决定捧他的场，买一本英文的，尝个鲜。

英国首相布朗在《华尔街日报》撰文呼吁大西洋两边紧密合作，全球推广英语。

In the last half-century the English language has become not only the language of Shakespeare and Twain, of J.K. Rowling and Cormac McCarthy, but of science, commerce, diplomacy, the Internet and travel….So, finally, I propose that together Britain and America strive to make the international language that happens to be our own far more freely available across the world.

大概六年前写过一篇文章The triumph of English in China，写中国的英语的疯狂和疯狂的英语。从一方面看，这是中国融入（西方）世界的一部分，我本人就受尽英语的恩惠，从工作到阅读《纽约客》或者王尔德；一方面，这看上去是不是也是一种cultural genocide？

布朗文章的标题是Enlarging the Anglosphere。文化屠杀论者是不是可以理解为Enlarging the Anglosjingoism。

世界就是一种阐释。

费半天劲，终于在iTouch上装上了英语词典。它有个好处，就是能记录下查询过的词，这样有助于记忆新单词（如果勤翻阅的话）。词典有多种选择，一种是美国的Merriam Webster, 一种是英国的Longman。大学的时候曾经用Merriam Webster Vocabulary Builder，对这个品牌一直很忠诚，现在家用的词典还是它的。郎文是最早进入视野的词典，记得初中的时候老见到这个牌子的词典。在iTouch上谁更好？更全面？我用《脏话文化史》的作者检验词典的方式来比较了一下。结果Merriam Webster对于很多涉及下半身的词语都给出Not Found的结果。但郎文忠实地给出所有解释条目。不过二者给出的词条解释和字典上的一模一样。但MW省去了词源介绍。郎文一字不漏。很惊讶自由软件的开发人员可以将一部大词典浓缩成几兆安装在这个小小的玩具里。

看来下半身就是检验词典的标准。

春夜乱读书。上期的《经济学人》和本期《大西洋月刊》都浓墨重彩写以色列建国60周年。一直对这个国家抱着同情和一知半解。看了报道才知道这个国家经过60年的成长之后却是一个矛盾重重的国家。一个古老的民族，一个年轻的国家。以色列人的困境是国家走向何方的问题，要一个纯犹太人的国家，还是包括阿拉伯人的多民族国家；要一个世俗国家还是一个宗教生活为主的国家；要一个全世界犹太人的以色利还是一个以色列人的以色列。

一直有一个问题，世界上最深刻最持久最恶毒的种族仇恨莫过于欧洲/西方基督教世界的反犹主义Anti-semitism，一种持续了近2000年的仇恨，并以屠杀数百万犹太人（除了纳粹德国的600万屠杀Holocaust，还有俄罗斯和东欧的大规模迫害和屠杀犹太人Pogrom。）的高潮作为一个结束段落。为什么？

对于反犹主义的起源和原因其实至今没有完整的解释。

不久前买了Martin Goodman今年出版的《Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations 》，翻出来，希望能从这位罗马和犹太文化专家笔下找到一些答案。Goodman承认，很多人从犹太人的宗教、拒绝同化、商业成功（引起嫉妒）等多方面来解释，但任何一方面都不能令人完全信服地解释如此深厚和长远的对犹太民族的仇恨。因为世界不同宗教和文化都存在很大差异，甚至水火不容，但没有反犹主义这么根深蒂固绵延2000年。

Christopher Hitchens在《God Is Not Great》中说，宗教就是毒药，就是屠刀。我比较认同。

看看今天的藏人和僧侣阶层。从很多方面看，一方面，他们是喜玛拉雅的犹太族，一方面，他们又是中华帝国中的巴勒斯坦。不同是，汉人的集体意识里面没有对其他民族的反犹式的仇恨。他们有悲情的Zionism，但历史不在他们这边。